Constitution requires the interpreter to optimise the realisation potential of all competing constitutionally recognised goods: all must be set limits in order that all may acquire optimal efficacy. 24 From a legal-sociological point of view, this "rule of harmonisation" or "optimisation" 25 is of vital importance for constitutions to realise their socio-political integrative function in an optimally accommodative and inclusive manner. In concrete cases, value choices correlate and overlap with competing human interests. property rights and respondents' right to freedom of movement to be resolved in a manner vindicating the rights of all parties to the greatest extent possible). 21 Scheuner 1963 VVDStRL 125.
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Hesse 1993 Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts 27.
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Lerche "Grundrechtsschranken" 777.
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Hesse 1993 Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts 27. In the course of the public hearings on the Bill, the chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Arts and Culture mooted the idea that one of the languages designated for official use must always be an indigenous language. She is reported to have said that "perhaps consideration should be given to making it mandatory that one of the languages was an 'African language' as in every province, bar KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), English and Afrikaans would always be present. These were realities that needed to be raised and addressed" (PMG 2011 http://bit.ly/ZQrEO5 2). The Department of Arts and Culture took up the suggestion and included the proposal that one of the official languages must be an indigenous language in its submissions before the Committee (Department of Arts and Culture 2012 http://bit.ly/112daQ8 para 7.3). This culminated in a proposed amendment which provided that a language policy must identity at least three official languages that the national department, national public entity or national illustrate how competing language interests are involved in attempts to simultaneously implement the values implied in the directive principles of affording languages equitable treatment and parity of esteem on the one hand and the development of disadvantaged languages on the other hand. 27 For the Constitution to realise its integrative potential, such choices require an awareness of the pitfalls of approaches which lead to marginalisation and exclusion. In Makwanyane 28 Sachs J therefore cautioned that " [w] hatever the status of earlier legislation and jurisprudence may be, the Constitution speaks for the whole of society and not just one section".
29
The following discussion will consider the implications for an understanding of section 6 of interpretively embedding a provision in the underlying basic values of the Constitution and reading that provision within the context of the Constitution as a whole, in order to preserve the latter's normative unity. It will be argued that such a contextual analysis will confirm the official language clause as a manifestation of an unambiguous larger commitment to an inclusive and accommodative approach to diversity. The commitment to inclusive linguistic diversity ought therefore to occupy the normative centre of section 6. The constitutional analysis will provide the background for the consideration of how the Act has given body to this commitment in its interpretation of the section 6 instruction to regulate and monitor the use of official languages. This involves an inquiry into both the extent to which inclusive public enterprise will use for the purposes of government, provided that at least two of the official languages identified must be indigenous languages of historically diminished use and status. The amendment was later abandoned, after widespread criticism because it could effectively have ruled out the use of Afrikaans as an official language, and replaced by the provision which requires at least three languages to be designated for official use, coupled with the proviso that in making the choice, the diminished use and status of the indigenous languages must be given due consideration.
27
This issue will be referred to again later. and sensible accommodation on an inclusive and principled basis that the Constitution itself emerged. It would accordingly be perverse to construe its terms in a way that belied or minimised the importance of the very inclusive process that led to its adoption, and sustains its legitimacy"; Ex parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re: Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the School Education Bill of 1995 1996 3 SA 165 (CC) para 52: "The objective should not be to set the principle of equality against that of cultural diversity, but rather to harmonise the two in the interest of both. Democracy in a pluralist society should accordingly not mean the end of cultural diversity, but rather its guarantee, accomplished on the secure basis of justice and equity." linguistic diversity defines the main objectives of the Act, as well as its institutionalisation in the implementation forms and structures envisaged by the Act.
Constitutional analysis
Since section 6 is about linguistic diversity, one way to go about ensuring that a particular reading of it promotes the foundational values of the Constitution and their coherence is to investigate how the Constitution positions itself in respect of diversity generally. If this should reveal a context-transcending principle, an exceptionalist approach in respect of section 6 would require a justification based on either unambiguous textual support or some alternative view of the principle governing official language use. Such an alternative must, however, itself be in harmony with the Constitution's "objective value system".
Equality, dignity and citizenship
Logically, an inquiry into the Constitution's message regarding diversity must start with the principle of equality. Apart from the fact that equality is expressly referred to as a founding principle of the Constitution, 30 it is within a constitution's notion of equality that its defining normative position towards the treatment of difference is located.
Already a superficial textual survey of section 9 points towards a predisposition in favour of broad inclusive diversity. The prohibited grounds of discrimination listed in section 9(3) represent an unusually extensive catalogue of the kinds of difference that the Constitution considers worthy of protection, of which linguistic diversity is The right and value of equality, when informed by the imperative of affording all persons equal respect and concern, functions as a bulwark against enforced uniformity:
[E]quality should not be confused with uniformity; in fact, uniformity can be the enemy of equality. Equality means equal concern and respect across difference. The development of an active rather than a purely formal sense of enjoying a common citizenship depends on recognising and accepting people as they are. The Constitution thus acknowledges the variability of human beings (genetic and sociocultural), affirms the right to be different, and celebrates the diversity of the nation.
Ngwena draws from the work of Martha Minow, 53 who develops a thesis of difference that has inclusive citizenship as its goal. He points out that the paradigm shift in the perception of difference that Minow propagates is a turn from a focus on differentiating between people for the purpose of creating boundaries to a focus on differentiating in order to create positive relationships, which she calls the social relations approach. should be guarded against are thought processes guided by "the logic of social group reductionism that draws its impulse from cultural and institutional modes of social division that have historically been oppressive". Fredman's framework provides a useful basis for formulating some conclusions regarding the interpretation of section 6 of the Constitution in the light of the underlying foundational constitutional values of equality, dignity and citizenship, and the notion of inclusive diversity that they inspire. Firstly, the unequivocal constitutional affirmation of diversity -or the acceptance of the "principle of difference" itself, as Sachs J called it 60 -requires language choices to be driven by an impulse of affirmation rather than negation and the exclusion of linguistic diversity. Albertyn writes that part of the project of realising substantive equality is the untying of difference from hierarchies, exclusion and disadvantage.
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Fundamental to the transformative mission of the Constitution is the "ability to establish or facilitate new and non-hierarchical normative frameworks of participation and social inclusion". 62 To paraphrase Ngwena, section 9 of the Constitution's message is that language is meant to be a category of inclusion, rather than exclusion, and the acceptance of diversity rather than a hierarchy of linguistic forms. 63 Substantive equality's emphasis on inclusivity prevents linguistic difference from becoming entangled in strategic power discourses in which groups are distinguished and positioned against one another, or for linguistic difference from becoming strategically necessary for the maintenance or consolidation of political power in institutional or ideological forms.
64
Secondly, the existence of the element of dignity in the concept of equality has important consequences for an understanding of the directive principles of equitable treatment, parity of esteem, the development of historically diminished indigenous languages and promoting and ensuring respect for non-official community and religious languages. The phrases "parity of esteem" and "the promotion and assurance of respect" are in themselves already explicit dignity-related expressions. Bolstered by the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution, they nevertheless are clearly binding instructions which require at the very minimum reasonable measures of realisation.
Thirdly, the remedial dimension of substantive equality referred to above -in conjunction with the value of dignity -serves to sharpen the senses for the full normative implications of the directive principle of elevating the status and advancing the use of the historically diminished indigenous languages. This developmental directive is integrally part and parcel of the broad transformative (remedial or restitutive) project inherent in the notion of substantive equality. As a prelude to the developmental directive, section 6(2) therefore starts with the recognition of the need to redress the "historically diminished use and status of the indigenous languages of our people." The state must take practical and positive measures to elevate their status and advance their use. Section 6(2) signals a clear intention to address the consequences of at least two of the paradigms which underpinned the language policy and practices of the apartheid era, namely the ethnically determined geographical fragmentation of language rights and the privileged position of languages of European origin (English and Afrikaans). In terms of the first paradigm, indigenous African languages found official recognition only element of community cohesion and identification for a distinct community in South Africa." The link between equality, dignity and the affirmation of identity implied in respecting linguistic rights is also stressed in the Oslo Recommendations on the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (1998) (OSCE 1998 http://bit.ly/16Ai339). In the explanatory note, it is said that "[e]quality in dignity and rights presupposes respect for the individual's identity as a human being. Language is one of the most fundamental components of human identity. Hence, respect for a person's dignity is intimately connected with respect for the person's identity and consequently for the person's language".
within the geographical confines of the nominally independent or self-governing ethnic "homelands". In terms of the second paradigm, the equal treatment of languages in the rest of South Africa was limited to the equal treatment of the two European languages, Afrikaans and English. 67
Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is textually located in section 36 of the Constitution, which sets out the conditions under which the rights recognised in the Bill of Rights may be limited. 68 It is therefore intimately connected with the effective realisation of fundamental rights, a fact recognised in other jurisdictions also. The German Federal Constitutional Court has depicted proportionality as a principle derived from the very nature of fundamental constitutional rights, since the latter express the general claim of citizens not to be restricted by public authorities more than is necessary in the public interest in demonstrating that "it has reached an 'optimisation of the affected conflicting interests' and has avoided policies that are 'excessive'".
83
Alexy subscribes to the standard three-pronged version of the proportionality test, namely suitability, necessity and proportionality in its narrow sense. 84 The requirement of "suitability" entails that a measure that restricts a principle must be closely connected to the realisation of another normative principle. 85 Secondly, "necessity" involves that if a principle could be equally effectively realised by more than one means, the measure least intrusive of the infringed principle must be selected. 86 The third element is referred to as "balancing in the narrow sense". It involves a process of assessing the relative "weight" of the substantive considerations underlying each competing principle in the circumstances of a given case. 87 The important point to note is that the analytical elements of the proportionality test are individually and collectively focused on the imperative of realising competing constitutional values or principles to the greatest extent Chaskalson P said that "[t]he limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality".
88
Alexy 2005 IJCL 572-573: "All these principles give expression to the idea of optimization.
Interpreting constitutional rights in light of the principle of proportionality is to treat constitutional rights as optimization requirements, that is, as principles, not simply as rules. As optimization requirements, principles are norms requiring that something be realized to the greatest extent possible, given the factual and legal possibilities." is factually possible. The third requirement (balancing) is normative, requiring that they be realised to the greatest extent in the light of countervailing norms.
89
Applied to section 6 of the Constitution, proportionality demands in general that the principle of inclusive linguistic diversity expressed in the official language clause must be related to other competing values, principles or considerations in a way which is non-reductionist and non-hierarchical. Non-reductionism requires that competing constitutional goods should be related to one another in a way which "preserves [their] plurality ... without reducing one ... into another and without lumping all of them together into some common space (like utility) that denies their plurality". 90 Non-hierarchical relatedness means that constitutional goods must not be pitched against each other in terms of an arbitrary abstract rank order. With reference to the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court Beatty suggests that the proper approach to follow in order to attain the appropriate balance is "that no one of the conflicting legal positions be preferred and maximally asserted, but all given as protective as possible an arrangement".
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In more specific terms, the principle of proportionality seems especially relevant regarding two problematic areas of the application of the official language clause.
The first concerns the relationship of the directive principles of state language policy (parity of esteem, equitable treatment and the development of indigenous languages) to practical considerations which may stand in the way of their optimal realisation at a given moment in time. Section 6(3)(a) provides that in the actual choice of language for government use, cognisance should be taken of factors such as usage, practicality, expense, regional circumstances and the balance of the needs and preferences of the population. It was seen above that the proportionality requirements of suitability and necessity have the objective of steering this relationship in the direction of an outcome in which principles are realised to the greatest extent that is practically possible. of the constitutional instruction to "regulate and monitor language use". As a result, the Act is Spartan in supplying instructive normative standards for use in making official language choices. Instead, the responsibility for the latter has been entrusted to the policy functions of institutionally non-independent administrative organs within national state departments, public entities and enterprises, with largely advisory functions.
The Act's message regarding the promotion of multilingualism
The preamble of the Act starts by confirming the official status of the eleven languages recognised as such in section 6(1) of the Constitution. It acknowledges the constitutional obligation that the "use of the Republic's official languages must be promoted and pursued", and reiterates the sections 6(2) and (4) directive principles. The directive principles, with the noted exception of the development directive, are again repeated in the section stipulating the objects of the Act.
Section 2 provides that the Act aims to regulate and monitor the use of official languages for government purposes by national government; promote the parity of esteem and equitable treatment of official languages of the Republic; facilitate equitable access to the services provided by national government and the information available from it; and promote good language management by national government for efficient public service administration and to meet the needs of the public.
The true test for the saliency afforded to the promotion of inclusive linguistic diversity is, however, the extent to which this principle is institutionalised in the operational body of the Act as such. It appears that the real responsibility for decisions regarding official language use is located in the policy-making competence of administrative bodies. Section 4(1) obliges national departments, national public entities and enterprises to adopt within 18 months a language policy on their use of official languages for government purposes. The matters that must be addressed in the language policy include: identifying at least three official languages to be used; stipulating how official languages will be used in government communication, notices, publications, etc; describing how the public will access language policy; providing a complaints mechanism to deal with the use of official languages; and describing how national government will communicate with members of the public whose language of choice is not one of the identified official languages or is South African Sign Language.
The important point to consider is therefore the Act's normative framework for policy formulation and the prominence that is accorded to the promotion of inclusive linguistic diversity in this respect. The Act expressly requires compliance with two guidelines only. Section 4(2)(a) provides that language policies must comply with the provisions of section 6(3) of the Constitution which, as has been noted aboveapart from prescribing a minimum of two languages for official use -contains the practical factors to consider when making restrictive language choices. Thus, the emphasis placed on section 6(3) is not particularly encouraging. On its own, it is devoid of all inclusivity-specific guidelines, and when severed from the directive principles, it mandates unguided discretionary powers to limit official language use.
Seen from the perspective of inclusivity, the Act 96 does improve on section 6(3)(a) of the Constitution in one respect by prescribing the identification of at least three official languages that national departments, public entities and enterprises must use for government purposes. 97 This is followed (in section 4(3)) by the proviso that in identifying at least three official languages, every national department, national public entity and enterprise must take into account its obligation to take practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of indigenous languages of historically diminished use and status.
Unlike the development directive, the directive principles of the promotion of parity of esteem and the equitable treatment of official languages are not mentioned specifically as binding guidelines for official language policy-making in section 4.
Instead, it is notable that the responsibility for the promotion of these two directive principles -which are most closely related to the promotion of multilingualism -has been expressly allocated to largely non-independent advisory and monitoring bodies.
The language policies and practices of national departments, public entities and enterprises will be monitored by a national language unit and language units within the national departments, public enterprises and entities. 98 One of the functions of the National Language Unit is to advise the Minister of Arts and Culture on policy and strategy "to promote parity of esteem and equitable treatment of the official languages of the Republic and facilitate equitable access to the services and information of national departments, national public entities and national public enterprises". 99 Similarly, the departmental, public enterprise and entity language units have the advisory and monitoring function "to promote parity of esteem and equitable treatment of official languages of the Republic and facilitate equitable access to services and information of the national department, national public entity or national public enterprise concerned". therefore be seen as a first step to "opening more doors" and as "providing a beginning which would eventually lead to the promotion, use and development of all official languages".
104
On the other hand, however, spokespersons for the Department were at pains to distance the Act from such an ambitious objective. In the Department's submissions to the Portfolio Committee, it was contended that although the Department acknowledges the concerns relating to multilingualism and the application of section 6(2) of the Constitution, "this Bill is not the appropriate mechanism to address these 
Conclusion
In the final analysis the Act must be judged in terms of two fundamental considerations. Firstly, if Justice Sachs was correct that the principle of inclusivity shines through the language provisions of the Constitution, then the question is:
does it shine through the Act, which after all was meant to implement those provisions? Secondly, does the Act represent clear progress in the quest for equity, clarity and predictability in official language use?
In spite of its proclaimed objectives, the Act envisages a flawed institutional setting for the promotion of official multilingualism. The primary responsibility for giving effect to the directive principles of state language policy has been entrusted to nonindependent administrative organs within national state departments, national public 118 See Böckenförde "Demokratie als Verfassungsprizip" 900-901. 119 For vagueness as a ground of judicial review, see generally Hoexter Administrative Law 298-301. enterprises and entities. Apart from lacking the necessary institutional competence, these bodies will have to function in terms of a very limited, and to some extent, confused normative framework for the promotion of multilingualism. This framework does not embody an unambiguous commitment to the promotion of official multilingualism, lacks legal certainty, and endows administrative organs with insufficiently circumscribed discretionary powers.
Given this state of affairs, the answer to both questions posed above must be negative. In so far as the Act has attempted to (re)kindle the flame of linguistic diversity, it has done so in a way that causes the "principle of diversity" to shine through its provisions only dimly, and most probably not lastingly. Neither does it represent any notable progress in the quest to achieve equity, clarity and predictability in official language use. 
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